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Abstract
Background: In this study, we use the case of medical doctors in the public health system in rural India to illustrate 
the nuances of how and why gaps in policy implementation occur at the frontline. Drawing on Lipsky’s Street Level 
Bureaucracy (SLB) theory, we consider doctors not as mechanical implementors of policies, but as having agency to 
implement modified policies that are better suited to their contexts.
Methods: We collected data from primary care doctors who worked in the public health system in rural Maharashtra, 
India between April and September 2018 (including 21 facility visits, 29 in depth interviews and several informal 
discussions). We first sorted the data inductively into themes. Then we used the SLB theoretical framework to categorise 
and visualise relationships between the extracted themes and deepen the analysis.
Results: Doctors reported facing several constraints in the implementation of primary care- including the lack of 
resources, the top-down imposition of programs that were not meaningful to them, limited support from the organization 
to improve processes as well as professional disinterest in their assigned roles. In response to these constraints, many 
doctors ‘routinized’ care, and became resigned and risk-averse. Most doctors felt a deep loss of professional identity, and 
accepted this loss as an inevitable part of a public sector job. Such attitudes and behaviours were not conducive to the 
delivery of good primary care.
Conclusion: This study adds to  empirical literature on doctors as Street Level Bureaucrats in lower and middle income 
countries. Doctors from these settings have often been blamed for not living up to their professional standards and 
implementing policies with rigour. This study highlights that doctors’ behaviours in these settings are ways through 
which they ‘cope’ with their loss of professional identity and organizational constraints; and highlights the need for 
appropriate interventions to counter their weak motivation. 
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Background
Not all policy rhetoric translates into practice as originally 
intended. Even when top-down policy mandates are firmly 
imposed, gaps in implementation of policies can occur in 
the frontlines of service delivery. Why such gaps occur – 
and what can be done about these – have been questions of 
interest to policy analysts. Theories such as Lipsky’s Street 
Level Bureaucracy (SLB) enable policy analysts to deepen 
their understanding of such gaps better.1 SLB theory posits 
that people at the frontline do not mechanistically comply to 
all imposed policy mandates.1-3 Nor do they implement these 
mandates in a vacuum. Instead, they implement a version of 
the policy mandate that appears to fit in with their everyday 
realities and contextual constraints.1-2,4 To cope with the wide 
range of contextual complexities they encounter, people at 
the frontline of policy delivery develop informal routines 
and practices.1-3,5,6 These routines and practices can be called 
‘coping behaviours’ and lead to policies being implemented in 
ways that are different from the written policy rhetoric. Hence, 
people in the frontline of policy delivery have been called 
‘Street Level Bureaucrats’ who create ‘policies as performed.’1 It 
is this version of policies that the public ultimately experiences.
In this paper, we have drawn on SLB theory to examine how 
medical doctors in public primary health centers (a type of 
peripheral health facility) in one rural area in India delivered 
routine primary care. We have asked two specific questions:
1.	 What were the ‘coping behaviours’ exhibited by doctors in 
primary health facilities in rural India?
2.	 In what ways did the professional identities of doctors 
vis-à-vis the organisational constraints they faced shape 
these ‘coping behaviours’?
This paper is an attempt to add to theory-driven, actor-
centric, empirical studies in the field of health policy 
implementation in low- and middle-income countries 
(LMICs). There has been a growing interest in understanding 
frontline health workers behaviours (nurses, doctors, outreach 
Ramani et al
International Journal of Health Policy and Management, 2020, x(x), 1–122
Implications for policy makers
• This study contributes to empirical literature from low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) that explains how the attitudes and behaviours 
of frontline health providers shape policies.
• In such settings, doctors have often been blamed for not implementing policies well and for not living up to professional expectations. But an 
alternate way of looking at these actions is by considering these as ways in which doctors ‘cope’ with the challenging situations they face during 
day-to-day work.
• Doctors face several constraints in the implementation of primary care – lack of professional interest in primary care roles, top-down policy 
mandates imposed on them, lack of community trust and systemically-engendered risk aversion. These constraints lead to demotivation, 
resignation and a loss of professional identity among doctors. Ultimately, they deliver a compromised version of primary care, different from 
that of policy expectations.
• Further technical training of doctors has often been offered as a means of improving the delivery of primary care in public health settings in 
LMICs. This study suggests that other interventions - such as supportive supervision, the use of appreciative enquiry techniques, as well as 
consultations and deliberation with staff regarding policy implementation-would also be important to improve care.
Implications for the public
In this study, we look at how health providers’ attitudes and behaviours shape policies, through the example of doctors who work in the public, 
primary health sector in India. Doctors reported that they had limited professional interest in delivering primary care, and were constrained by other 
issues such as the lack of infrastructure, the imposition of too many targets and a lack of connection with the community. Doctors’ also acknowledged 
that such constraints led them to adopt behaviours that could potentially comprise the delivery of primary care.  These findings suggest that the 
provision of technical training or the mere imposition of top-down targets on health providers are not adequate to make policies succeed. To ensure 
policy success, people in the frontline have to be supported and motivated in other ways.
Key Messages 
workers and managers) in such settings.7-12 However, within 
LMIC literature, medical doctors working at the frontlines of 
care delivery have been less frequently been examined using 
SLB theory (some recent exceptions being Karadaghi and 
Willott,13 Gaede,14 Kelly15). In this paper, we have explicitly 
focussed on understanding the perspectives of medical 
doctors. This focus is particularly interesting since doctors 
often experience tensions between their twin identities as 
‘professionals’ and as ‘bureaucrats,’ and struggle to balance 
these different identities in their actions.16
Another contribution of this study is its focus on the 
implementation of day-to-day primary care. Most studies 
from LMICs that have engaged with SLB theory focus on 
how staff in the frontline deal with newly instituted health 
policies. Very few studies have examined the implementation 
of policies long in existence and looked at routine practices 
within health systems (termed “coping” in this study) as 
important influencers of policy success on the ground.6,16-17 
In this study, we have treated the delivery of primary care 
by doctors as a “routine” policy, and have focussed on the 
decisions made by doctors in their day-to-day work.
This paper builds on a previously published paper that 
delineated broad contextual influences on primary health 
centers in India.18 Located in peripheral areas, these centers 
are intended to deliver preventive as well as basic curative 
care in the public health system (see Box 1 for a detailed 
background). The quality of care delivered by such facilities, 
and indeed, similar facilities in other LMICs, has been 
lamented repeatedly.19 Literature indicates that frontline 
workers such as doctors and nurses, in these settings, often 
exhibit disrespectful attitudes towards patients and do not 
live up to professional expectations.20-22 In this paper, we have 
endeavoured to move beyond blaming frontline workers for 
such actions and attitudes. Instead, taking one small rural 
area in India as a case, we have examined doctor’s behaviours 
as contextually situated actions; and have attempted to 
understand the nature of their behaviours as well as why 




This study was conducted in rural Maharashtra, a state in 
western India. Maharashtra is considered as one of the five 
‘high production’ states for allopathic doctors in India, having 
52 medical colleges of which 23 are public.25,26 A one-year 
rural service stint is compulsory for all undergraduate medical 
students from public colleges and this policy, to some extent, 
has enabled the filling of allopathic doctors’ posts at primary 
health centers in the state (unlike many other Indian states).27 
Despite filled posts, primary health centers in Maharashtra 
often do not serve as first access care to communities. A 2014 
national survey found that in Maharashtra, only 7.5% of 
people seeking ambulatory care utilized primary-level tiers in 
the public health system.28
This study was undertaken in one small rural area. The 
name of the area as well as the district have been masked to 
protect the participants. This area had access to approximately 
80 primary-level facilities, one district-level (secondary care) 
hospital and one non-for-profit tertiary care hospital. This area 
was chosen for the study since it had a mix of facilities with 
‘good’ and ‘poor’ infrastructure (measured as per government 
quality standards) and posts for allopathic doctors was filled 
in most of the facilities. Process indicators from the health 
centers in this rural area for services like antenatal care and 
immunization were slightly better than that of state averages; 
and the area was considered to be overall, a ‘medium’ 
performing region (according to the state and district level 
authorities).
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Data Collection
We visited 21 health facilities and interviewed 29 public sector 
doctors from the rural area we selected (see Table 1 for details on 
data collection). We used the principle of maximum diversity 
to choose doctors for our interviews; we tried to include 
doctors of different ages and experiences, from facilities with 
good and not-so good infrastructure and from remote as well 
easy-to-access facilities. We purposively sampled four female 
doctors who were available in this region (the lack of female 
doctors in peripheral areas is an important concern across 
rural areas in India29). We also sought the opinion of 5 doctors 
who had earlier worked in primary care roles and had now 
moved on to other roles- to offer comparative perspectives on 
the different roles they performed.
We used an unstructured topic guide to facilitate our 
discussions with the doctors (see Table 1 for key themes in 
the topic guide). During these discussions, doctors were 
encouraged to talk about various situations that came up 
during their day-to-day work and the ways through which 
they dealt with them. These concrete examples were used 
as anchors to understand and delve deeper into factors that 
shaped doctors’ attitudes and actions.
Most interviews lasted about an hour and were conducted 
in a mix of English and the local language. The interviews 
and visits were done between April and September 2018 in 
four iterations. We voice-recorded 15 interviews, whilst also 
taking some notes, but judged that we would be able to get 
less-guarded responses if we did not record. Hence, the latter 
half of the interviews were semi-recorded or unrecorded; 
accompanied, rather, by lengthy notes written during and 
post the interview. Many doctors also spent time with the 
first author showing the different services available in the 
health center; this time provided an opportunity for informal 
conversations that yielded rich information. Most of the 
interviews were done by the first author. Logistical support 
for data collection was provided by the Center for Social 
Medicine, Pravara Institute of Medical Sciences.
Primary health centers are peripheral health facilities within 
India’s tiered, pyramidal public health system. They are intended 
to be frontline institutions of care, delivering integrated preventive 
and curative care close to homes of people – and linking to 
specialty care through referral. These centers are considered as the 
first access points to a medical doctor in the public health system. 
One primary health center is intended for every 30, 000 population 
(20 000 in tribal and hilly areas).
The doctor at a primary health center (in this context, having 
an undergraduate degree in allopathic medicine) is considered as 
a social physician, responsible for the health of the entire service 
area under a primary health center. As the medical officer-in-
charge, the doctor also serves as the administrative head of the 
health center, and manages the support staff (nurses, laboratory 
technicians, pharmacist and other outreach workers). Other roles 
include the provision of primary-level clinical care, oversight of 
outreach care, implementation of all programs and schemes, and 
overall management of staff.
Source: Bulletin of rural health statistics, 201723 and Indian Public 
Health Standards, 2012.24
Box 1. Primary Health Centers in India and the Role of Allopathic Doctors
Table 1. Details of Data Collection
Profile of Study Participants
Total N = 27a
Education Allopathic undergraduate degree: 22, Post-graduate degree: 5 
Gender Male: 23, Female: 4
Age
Average age of participants: 39.2
Less than 25 years of age: 4
25-45 years of age:16
More than 45 years of age: 7
Years of experience
Average years of experience of participants: 12.1
Less than 5 years of experience: 6
5-15 years of experience:12
More than 15 years of experience: 9
Place of work
Higher tiers of the system: 5b
Primary health centers – easy to access (less than 10 km from state highway): 9
Primary health centers – remote (more than 10 km from state): 13
Key themes in the topic guide
•	 Doctor’s roles at the primary health centers
•	 Doctors professional goals and dreams
•	 Stories about their best experiences at the primary health center (while implementing programs or doing outpatient care)
•	 Stories about challenging experiences and circumstances
•	 Stories about professional colleagues in other places
•	 Examples of situations that doctors faced day-to-day and how they dealt with these
•	 Doctors’ position in the organizational hierarchy and relationships (stories or experiences pertaining to interactions with seniors)
•	 Doctors’ relationships with support staff (examples of interactions with support staff)
•	 Doctors’ relationships with patients and the community (examples of interactions with the community)
a We do not have the demographics of two doctors.
b These doctors had experience and knowledge about primary care and discussions with them helped to illustrate differences in work roles between peripheral 
and higher levels of the public system.
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Data Analysis
All recorded interviews were transcribed into English. The 
transcripts and field notes were first open-coded. The initial 
themes that emerged (such as the categories of influences, or 
decisions doctors took) appeared to resonate well with the 
theoretical lens of SLB, so we used concepts from this theory 
to deepen the analysis. We worked iteratively with the list of 
themes that emerged and constructed data displays (tables 
and charts) to organize and detect patterns of relationships 
in the data. We used NVivo version 12 to aid the coding 
process. The first author led the analysis, but the preliminary 
analytical summaries and data displays were shared with 
the other authors to allow for interpretation. During the last 
iteration of data collection, these summaries were shared 
with 2 additional doctors from the public system for further 
validation. 
 Consent from all participants was taken; but ten doctors 
preferred to give verbal rather than written consent for the 
interviews (the doctors were willing to participate but did 
not want to sign a form). When given permission to record, 
interviews were audio-recorded. All recordings were deleted 
after being transcribed. All data in the transcripts has been 
anonymised. In the paper, we have not mentioned the name 
of the rural area or of the particular health centers so as to 
protect the identity of health system staff. Permissions for 
the study were granted by the state of Maharashtra as well as 
district-level authorities.
Use of the Street Level Bureaucracy Theory for Analysis
Lipsky’s original theory- set in contexts where frontline 
workers were blamed for being aggressive and irresponsive 
to client needs- contended that frontline workers exhibited 
these behaviours as responses to challenges in the public 
sector bureaucracy.1 These reactions were, thus, not “random 
acts of noncompliant behaviour,”5 but ways through which the 
doctors used their discretionary power and ‘coped.’30 Lipksy 
originally categorised the coping behaviours of frontline 
workers as those pertaining to modifying client demands 
(thus maximising use of resources), modifying job objectives 
(including mentally withdrawing from jobs) and modifying 
perceptions of clients (by favouring some instead of all).1 
Subsequent literature has tried to expand on these categories. 
For instance, Brehm and Gates categorised the behaviours of 
bureaucrats into three categories – ‘working’ (devoting extra-
ordinary effort, more than what is obligatory), ‘sabotaging’ 
(deliberately working against policy goals) and ‘shirking’ 
(putting less effort into policy goals or more efforts into non-
policy goals).31 More recently, Tummers et al had put forth a 
typology of coping behaviours, synthesized from literature 
across several disciplines. Here, coping was defined as “the 
cognitive and behavioural efforts made by frontline workers 
to master, tolerate, or reduce external and internal demands 
and conflicts among them during policy implementation.”32 
We found this typology to be comprehensive; and the 
categorization of coping behaviours used here seemed to fit 
well with the initial analytical themes that we had inductively 
extracted . We have adapted this typology for this study and 
have looked at coping in terms of:
1. specific instances of coping – specific examples of action 
observed or reported by doctors (like a doctor not doing 
an out-patient clinic that is mandated)
2. coping strategies – mechanisms that surround coping 
instances (like a doctor rationing and routinising care) 
and 
3. adaptive processes – broader attitudes and behaviours 
that have become routine among doctors in the public 
primary care sector (like doctors becoming risk-averse or 
learning to game the system). 
Tummers et al had also grouped coping behaviours as those 
that moved towards clients (made pragmatic adjustments to 
aid client needs), those that moved away from clients (actions 
that avoided meaningful interactions that can benefit clients) 
and those that moved against clients (being confrontational 
with clients).32 We could not find instances of coping 
behaviours that moved against clients in our data, so we have 
used only the other two groups to report our findings. 
After delineating the nature of coping behaviours by 
doctors, we also examined why such behaviours persisted in 
the frontlines of the public health system. Lipsky included 
constraints of resources, ambiguous policies, increased work 
burden and work stress as some of the issues encountered 
at the frontline.1 Derived from these ideas, many efforts 
have been made to systematically understand factors that 
influenced street-level action. Previous literature from LMICs 
has categorised factors shaping coping behaviours of street 
level bureaucrats as: individual characteristics (values, norms, 
gender, profession); organizational characteristics (structure, 
formal and informal rules, culture, workload); community or 
patient characteristics (needs, perceptions of workers); and 
other broader socio-political systems.2-4 We have used similar 
categories to examine our findings. We have also looked 
specifically at the interactions between doctors’ professional 
identities and issues in the organizational context- for these 
interactions played out strongly in our data.
Results
We have reported the findings of this paper in two sections. 
First, we have described various coping attitudes and 
behaviours exhibited by doctors in primary health centers 
(section 1). Then, we have examined why such coping 
behaviours persist in health system, thereby contributing to 
gaps in service delivery at primary health centers (section 2).
Section 1: The Nature of Coping Behaviours Reported by 
Doctors in Primary Health Centers
Below, we have summarised a list of coping behaviours found in 
our data, and have defined these behaviours using adaptations 
of definitions used previously in SLB literature.1,3,7,32 Adapting 
from Tummers et al classification,32 we have discussed 
coping behaviours in terms of “moving away from patients” 
(doing actions/interactions that are less meaningful to the 
community) and “moving towards patients”(making practical 
adjustments to benefit the community) (see Table 2).
Coping: Moving Away From Patients
Our discussions with doctors revealed several coping 
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behaviours at primary health centers that moved away from 
patients (Table 3 highlights some reported experiences). One 
of the key roles assigned to doctors at primary health centers 
was to provide basic outpatient care to patients and refer them 
for continued treatment to the higher tiers of the system if 
needed. However, doctors often did not do justice to this role. 
Indeed, many doctors resorted to conducting only one Out 
Patient Clinic in a day despite being mandated to conduct 
two (see Table 3, action 1). Doctors reported that they often 
saw patients quickly and did not spend time engaging deeply 
with them (see Table 3, actions 2- 5). Some doctors also 
reported instances where they were forced to give priority to 
certain patients (who did not need medical priority) due to 
the demands of local politicians (see Table 3, action 4). Some 
of them acknowledged that they referred more patients to 
the higher tiers of the system than clinically necessary (see 
Table 3, action 6). In short, most doctors appeared to deliver 
rationed and routinized outpatient care, and often distanced 
themselves from patients’ needs.
Another important role of doctors in primary health centers 
was to administer and manage several vertically-run programs 
and schemes that ran from these facilities. Most of these 
programs involved a community outreach component that 
was to be done by support staff, under the overall supervision 
of doctors. Doctors often shared that they had little interest in 
the administrative work that surrounded the implementation 
of these programs; but had no choice about such work. Many 
doctors reported resorting to short-cuts (or ignoring short-
cuts taken by other staff) in implementing these programs 
(see Table 3, action 7-10). They often routinized program 
implementation and invoked a different meaning of the 
program in order to justify the short-cuts routinely taken (see 
Table 3, action 9-10).
Over time, most doctors in primary health facilities 
reported getting used to a way of functioning that was less 
than ideal. They became resigned and accepted their inability 
to change things for the better. This attitude of resignation 
was visible in many conversations with doctors:
“I have a colleague. After years in this system, nothing 
bothers him, he has become rough and tough and does little 
work. Hardly comes to the center. He has started feeling 
‘nothing will happen to us-then why should we work?’ We 
have stopped caring about what people want” (Medical 
Officer, Male, 8 years of work experience).
“But then this is way the system is. Nothing works. Who 
will make things better? Why? Best to keep quiet and work 
with what the government gives” (Medical Officer, Male, 20 
years of work experience).
Further, most doctors got used to taking risk-averse 
decisions in primary health centers, as well as making 
professional compromises in the day-to-day work (see Table 
3, column on adaptive strategies across actions 1-10). They 
felt alienated from the programs and schemes that ran from 
primary health centers, did not find meaning in implementing 
them well, and sometimes resorted to gaming the system 
(see Table 3, column on adaptive strategies across actions 
6-10). Most doctors at primary health centers today seemed 
to have reconciled themselves to the idea that survival in the 
government system meant the sacrifice of their “clinician” 
hats. As one doctor put it, the work in primary health centers 
had become about
“Work as usual. Not do too much extra. Just do what’s 
possible” (Medical Officer, Male, 13 years of experience).
What were the implications of doctors’ coping behaviours 
on the work of primary health centers? The resigned attitudes 
of doctors, their distancing from patients, the rationing 
and routinising of care along with the adoption of a risk-
averse approach contributed to the delivery of poor-quality 
outpatient care. Further, the same attitudes of resignation 
and inability to change things for the better contributed to 
the perfunctory and diluted implementation of programs at 
primary health centers.
Coping: Moving Towards Patients
We found only a few doctors who reported behaviours that 
moved towards patients. These doctors bent rules for the sake 
of patients rather than for personal benefit and tried to retain 
their professional identities (see Table 4, actions 1-3). It was 
interesting to note that even while these doctors bent rules 
to help patients, these rules were often bent in “safe mode.” 
Table 2. A Summary of Coping Behaviours at Primary Health Centers




Rationing care: Doctors rationed care by decreasing service availability or decreasing attractiveness of 
service and hence save resources in a constrained environment.
Routinizing care: Doctors routinized care by doing a less thorough, non- systematic processing of 
patients.
Patient categorization: Doctors selected some patients in lieu of others and have informal selection 
criteria and barriers.
Invoking a different policy understanding: Doctors invoked a meaning of the policy that was different 
from what was intended thereby reduce commitment to intended goals.
Priority-setting: Doctors worked only on what they perceived as priorities, especially those encouraged 
within the organization.
Distancing:  Doctors remained mentally withdrawn from patients/beneficiaries and are non-responsive 
to their problems.
Became risk-averse, sacrificed 
the professional and learnt 
the “rules of the game,” 





Rule bending: Doctors adjusted a formal rule as per patient demands.
Retaining professional identities: Within available circumstances, doctors tried to be better professionals 
and serve the community.
Doctors tried to be better 
professionals even while 
being risk-averse.
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Table 3. Doctors’ Coping Behaviours That Moved Away From Patients/Beneficiaries
Illustrative Instances of Coping Coping Strategies Adaptive Processes Implications on Care Provided
Outpatient care One doctor reported having adequate drug supplies to do only one outpatient clinic in a day, rather than the mandated 
two (Action 1).
Rationing care • Resignation
• Sacrificing the 
professional
• Risk-averseness 
Implications for outpatient care
• Doctors conducted only one outpatient 
clinic in a day (despite being mandated 
to conduct two).
• Doctors saw patients very quickly and 
made professional compromises while 
providing care.
• Doctors did not provide equal care to all 
patients.
• Doctors referred more patients than 
clinically required.
One doctor reported that he saw the medicines that he had given a patient thrown on the footpath in front of the health 
facility. This incident made him feel that it was no use trying to help patients who did not trust his professional opinion. 




Many doctors shared that the ‘actual’ work of the primary health center was to implement programs and schemes; and 
outpatient clinics were not important part of their reporting mandates. Hence, they rapidly dealt with outpatient work 




Doctors often reported giving preferential treatment to friends and relatives of local politicians. If they refused to do so, 
there was danger of these politicians creating obstacles to other outreach work (Action 4).
Patient categorization
Some doctors reported that they had only a few drugs to work with in the health center, so they prescribed the same 
drugs again and again to patients (even while knowing that these drugs were not the best clinical choices). These doctors 
reported that patients would get angry if they sent them back without drugs or asked them to buy drugs from outside. 




One doctor referred all cases of delivery that came to his health center- since he felt that he neither had staff or facilities 
to deal with emergencies. He did not want to take a ‘risk’ (Action 6).
Invoking different 
policy understanding
Programs Many doctors shared that too many schemes ran from the health centers; and staff numbers were adequate to do all 









• Doctors ignored shortcuts taken by 
staff, contributing to compromises in 
outreach.
• Doctors reconciled themselves to 
the diluted, perfunctory delivery of 
schemes.
One doctor tried to take action against a nurse who refused to complete duty-hours, but he received no support from 
the authorities to suspend her. He was told to “adjust” and carry on. After this incident, he stopped trying to better the 
implementation of schemes (Action 8).
Routinizing 
Distancing
One doctor was told to open bank accounts for all patients with respect to a health scheme. He felt he should be given 
only “technical work” and not work of this sort, so he monitored only a few account openings (Action 9).
Invoking different 
policy understanding
A doctor once forgot to call a local politician for an inauguration event of an immunization campaign, and this led to 
several implementation obstacles. Post this incident, he felt that politically appropriate launches were more important 
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For instance, in Table 4 action 1, the doctor who bent rules 
by writing prescriptions for patients when drugs were not 
available, did not do so for all patients; he only did so when 
he felt that a particular patient would accept the act. In other 
circumstances, he routinized care as usual.
Section 2: Factors That Shaped the Coping Behaviours 
of Doctors: Professional Identities Versus Organisational 
Constraints
Why did doctors in primary health centers behave the way 
they did? The coping instances described in Tables 3 and 4 
provide a glimpse of the reasons given by doctors for their 
actions; however, in this section, we have analysed these 
reasons further. Table 5 summarizes the factors that shaped 
doctors’ actions.
The factors in Table 5 were separated from each other for the 
purpose of examination; but it was the interactions between 
these factors that were interesting. Particularly interesting 
were the interactions between doctors’ twin identities as 
a clinician (professional factors) and a bureaucrat in the 
system (organizational factors). Clearly, there was a mismatch 
between the professional goals of doctors and the roles they 
were assigned at primary health centers. Discussions with 
doctors revealed that the provision of routine outpatient care 
for basic ailments like cough, cold and fever was not perceived 
as clinically exciting. Doctors wanted “good” clinical work, 
that is, cases where the diagnosis was difficult, and where 
their professional expertise added value. The work at primary 
health centers made them feel cheated of opportunities to use 
their professional knowledge. Such work was often defined 
Table 4. Doctors’ Coping Behaviours That Moved Towards Patients
Illustrative Instances of Coping Coping Strategies Coping - Adaptive Processes
Implications on Care 
Provision
A few doctors acknowledged writing informal prescriptions to help patients 
when appropriate drugs were not available at the health centers. These 
doctors did this only when they felt confident that these patients would 




attempted to retain 
a professional 
identity within a 
risk-averse frame of 
working
Some attempts being 
made to deliver primary 
care in line with 
professional ideals.
One doctor felt that the local private practitioner fleeced poor rural 
patients of their hard-earned money. So, he tried to make his outpatient 
clinic more attractive to patients by behaving the way private practitioners 
did- by smiling at patients, giving instant relief treatments sought by 
patients and incorporating “drama” into his daily clinic (Action 2).
Retaining professional 
identities
One doctor refused to provide obstetric care at his primary health center 
despite top-down pressure to do so. He felt that he would be risking the 
life of the patient by doing so- and shared that he would rather face the 
anger of his superiors than put women’s lives at risk. However, he tried to 




Table 5. Factors That Influenced Doctors’ Attitudes and Actions at Primary Health Centers
Label     Details Underlying Beliefs
Profession-related 
factors
•	 The primary health center was not perceived as a place for good clinical work- since it had 
few drugs and equipment to work with. Primary care roles were perceived as hindering 
professional growth.
•	Doctors’ roles in primary health centers was perceived as reduced to being that of 
administrators and social workers, leading to a lack of professional satisfaction.
•	Doctors felt professionally isolated in primary health centers.
•	 Perceived lack of 
professional value in 
executing primary care 
roles.
•	Did not want to work 
in public systems; 
preferred the private 
sector.
•	 Public sector jobs 
needed one to be risk-
averse.
•	Mistrust and lack of 




Perceived structural deterrents at primary health centers
•	 Limited facilities and drugs, poor infrastructure.
•	 Vertical programs that functioned with strong targets.
•	 Lack of adequate support staff for outreach.
Non-structural organizational issues
•	 “Narrow” mandates to provide only certain services.
•	 Too many targets were imposed by higher-ups. 
•	 Emphasis on reporting rather than doing “good” work.
•	 Some doctors felt that they had little actual authority over outreach staff-even as heads 
of these centers.




•	Doctors felt they could do little for patients due to the constraints of drugs and 
equipment they faced.
•	Doctors reported facing clinically irrational demands from patients.
•	 Local politicians demanded preferential services.
•	 Reports of violence against doctors engendered fear.
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by doctors as “not doing much,” “nothing big” and “nothing 
more than first aid and paper-work” – and had a derisive tone 
attached to it. Doctors felt that their work in primary health 
centers had mainly become that of a “social worker” and an 
“administrator” rather than that of a “real doctor.”
The loss of doctors’ professional identity at primary health 
facilities was not only linked to mismatched roles, but also 
to poor relationships with the community. While all doctors 
reported getting into the medical profession to “serve the 
community,” most acknowledged becoming disillusioned 
about this goal during the course of their work. Doctors 
shared that patients often came into primary health centers 
with low expectations of care, only when they had run out of 
alternatives, and did not ‘trust’ the medicines provided. Many 
doctors reported that they feared being subjected to physical 
violence by community members in case of a clinical mishap. 
Hence, they did not attempt potentially complex care (like 
a complicated delivery) even when the situation demanded 
it; and often took risk-averse decisions. They referred more 
cases than clinically necessary – for doctors shared that a 
clinical mishap “gave the government a bad name,” following 
which they would be blamed for their actions not only by the 
patients, but also by the higher authorities. Disillusioned by 
their lack of support for being ‘good’ professionals, doctors felt 
helpless and unable to help the community. Hence, they often 
stopped trying to live up to the professional standards they 
had once recognised for themselves. In the course of doing 
so, they sacrificed their clinician hats. For most doctors, this 
was a great burden to bear (see Box 2 for illustrative quotes 
on this point).
However, we also encountered a few doctors in the system 
who had managed to retain vestiges of their professional 
identity and tried to ‘cope’ with the situation by adopting 
positive behaviours (for instance, see Box 3. This doctor 
tried hard not to become just a “paper-work” person). But 
such doctors were few, and most doctors in the public system 
appeared to have accepted their diminished professional 
status.
Interestingly, even doctors who had accepted the dominance 
of their bureaucratic identity over the professional one did 
not always do justice to the ‘administrative’ roles assigned to 
them. Doctors reported several constraints at primary health 
facilities that prevented them from being good administrators 
(see Box 4 for quotes). They shared being overwhelmed by 
the targets and the number of schemes/programs imposed on 
them by district-level authorities. They shared that schemes 
and programs often ‘came and went’ and doctors were often 
not given explanations for why a particular scheme was 
withdrawn suddenly. Further, doctors also shared that the 
numbers of support staff at primary health centers were 
inadequate to do the kind of work that was expected from 
the health center by higher-level authorities. Thus, most of 
them felt that they had no option but to ignore the short-cuts 
taken by support staff at the health centers while executing 
program-related work. They often ended up executing 
programs mainly for ‘reporting purposes.’
Doctors also shared that doing anything “extra” while 
“This work is for people who are administratively strong. 
Last week, I had to open bank accounts for all people and get 
signatures. Not really the work I want to do” (Medical Officer, 
Male, 4 years of work experience in primary care and 4 years 
in higher tiers).
“Some instruction will come from above … people from the top 
pick up the phone and say ‘send this report it, that report’ that 
all has to be done at (name of the center). Nothing that uses my 
doctor skills” (Medical Officer, Male, 1 year of work experience).
“Down in the system, people create trouble, politicians create 
trouble and you can’t work. I so much prefer the (district level) 
hospital” (Female doctor, who used to work at primary levels 
previously).
“Sometimes I feel really bad … with so much difficulty I 
have obtained this qualification … this big degree … and after 
this, what kind of service I am giving people? No medicines, no 
investigations … I don’t even have a IV line … why will a patient 
come to me? What can I do for them?” (Medical Officer, Male, 
13 years of work experience).
“What change? Better to let things be as they are … how things 
are going on, let them go on the same way. Nothing is in our 
hands, right? See, like today, we have given a demand for drugs, 
I know nothing will come … still I demand … and we adjust 
with what is there” (Medical Officer, Male, 9 years of work 
experience).
Box 2. The Sacrifice of the Clinician’s Hat And Being “Just a” Bureaucrat: 
Illustrative Quotes
This doctor, having 10 years of experience shared that he had 
invested too much in being a “professional”. Hence, he did not 
want to limit himself to doing only the minimal administrative 
work requirements of the health center. 
However, he also felt that there was little appreciation for the 
good clinical care practices that he had been trying to bring into 
the health center. Since his posting, attendance at the outpatient 
clinic at the health center had tripled, he said, but this fact was not 
even acknowledged by his superiors. This doctor had also tried to 
improve outreach services at the health center- by trying to push 
his outreach team to do deeper work. He admitted his inability to 
do so; for while he changed his routine and stayed at the primary 
health center during his entire official duty hours, he could not 
motivate his staff to do so. The doctor also said that most of his 
staff was older, had been in the government system for more than 
20 years; and did not always listen to him. 
The doctor reported being wary of getting institutionalised. 
He was worried that over time, he would get habituated to such 
a system of working and he actively resisted getting into what he 
called as “the typical government mindset of not doing anything 
more.” However, he also defended the government system saying 
they were not entirely at fault; in the past, the media had often 
exaggerated issues and dramatized mishaps and accidents and 
hence, public systems had learnt to be careful. 
This doctor understood the “rules” of the game, but he did not 
want to get reduced to becoming a “paper-work” person.  Hence, 
he tried to be a better professional within the broad framework of 
being risk-averse.
Box 3. Case Illustrating a Doctor Who Tried to Retain His Professional Identity 
by Adopting Positive Behaviours
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managing programs (that was beyond their reporting 
mandates) posed a “risk;” and such actions, though not 
formally prohibited, were not encouraged or supported in 
the public system. A few doctors reported failed attempts to 
improve this state of affairs. One doctor had tried to send a 
memo to district authorities for the suspension of a support 
staff member who had refused to do outreach work; but there 
was no action taken on his memo despite many reminders. 
That experience had taught him that his job was to ‘make do 
with what he had’ and not to improve the implementation of 
programs. In fact, we encountered the idea that it was not 
the doctor’s job to improve implementation processes, many 
times during our conversations. Box 5 illustrates a detailed 
case of this attitude pertaining to a screening program that 
was launched during the time of our discussions. 
Younger doctors sometimes shared that they felt 
uncomfortable not doing anything about the routine 
compromises they had to made during their work at primary 
health centers. However, they had been ‘taught’ by the more 
senior doctors that making efforts to change the way things 
worked in the public system was essentially pointless. More 
experienced doctors shared they had become used to this 
work and hence felt little distress when they compromised 
in care provision; for they had accepted these issues as an 
integral part of the job.
Below, we summarise the study findings from section 1 and 
2. Doctors reported several challenges in delivering primary 
healthcare-including the lack of resources, the top-down 
imposition of programs that were not meaningful to them, 
limited support from the organization to improve processes as 
well as professional disinterest . These challenges contributed 
to the adoption of a range of coping attitudes and behaviours. 
Most doctors routinized and rationed care, and often became 
resigned and risk-averse. Most of them felt a deep loss of their 
professional identity, and accepted this loss as an inevitable 
“… Day by day., the national programs burden is increasing, 
and new schemes are being launched … the field staff finds 
it tough … what will they do? Reporting or field work? Or 
administration … all this affects the quality of work” (Medical 
Officer, Male, 12 years of work experience).
“There are so many lacunae in government…so what can 
we do, you tell me? Medicines are not there … equipment is not 
there … we can do nothing. We are like you only…we can do 
nothing. It’s a bigger pattern outside of our control…” (Medical 
Officer, Male, 20 years of work experience).
“The issue is that once you get into the government, there is a 
danger of you getting institutionalised. The more time you spend 
in certain settings, you become like that … one has to be very 
careful not to fall into the rut of doing nothing” (Medical Officer, 
Male, 10 years of work experience).
“It is all government policy to make which policy, which 
scheme … and how to implement it … it has nothing to go with 
me … I just follow … I do my work” (Medical Officer, female, <1 
year of work experience).
Box 4. Challenges Faced in the Organizational Set up by Doctors: Illustrative 
Quotes
During the time of our discussions, doctors were asked to participate 
in a massive screening campaign for non-communicable diseases 
(NCDs); but no treatment was available post-diagnosis for patients 
as per policy. Many doctors felt that screening without providing 
drugs was unethical; some shared that they were not trained to 
screen; others said that the diagnosis of NCDs was beyond the 
scope of primary-level care. However, these implementation 
concerns were rarely discussed with higher-level managers. It was 
generally acknowledged that top-level administrators were ‘happy’ 
as long as some version of the NCD policy directive was getting 
implemented on the ground. One doctor said that improving 
implementation processes was subtly discouraged in the public 
system and he had learnt through experience that it was “not his 
business” to improve implementation. Most doctors had worked 
out a way to implement the scheme for “name-sake” only- that is, 
superficially, by completing minimally required screening targets. 
Box 5. Experiences of Doctors Who Participated in a Screening Program
part of a public sector job. Further, most doctors felt that they 
could not do justice to the administrative roles that they had 
been assigned. Such coping behaviours, on balance are likely 
to impact negatively on the quality of care provided from 
primary health centers. 
Discussion 
While the volume of actor-centric, empirical studies in the 
field of policy implementation has been growing recently in 
LMICs, few studies have looked at explicitly at doctors - as 
Street Level Bureaucrats. One reason for this could be that 
doctors have typically been considered a group of highly-
skilled professionals with inherent discretionary power16; 
allowing their bureaucratic identity to be subsumed into 
their professional one. Our study shows, however, that there 
is merit in looking at doctors’ actions using SLB theory. 
Through the SLB lens, doctors’ actions are not treated solely 
as professional decisions. Instead, the actions are seen as ways 
through which these professionals ‘cope’ with a wide range 
of contextual factors; and ‘coping’ causes them to sustain 
particular attitudes and work-routines in the long-run. Thus, 
the use of the SLB lens expands the understanding of doctors’ 
actions as contextually situated routines.
 ‘Coping’ has always been a central concept in SLB theory,1-3 
and some empirical LMIC literature does touch on how 
frontline health staff ‘cope’ by adopting certain attitudes 
and actions (such as rationing, distancing from patients and 
categorising patients) during policy implementation.7,9,10,12,15 
However, the knowledge base is still limited and more studies 
that systematically categorise coping behaviours and elicit 
nuanced accounts of these behaviours are needed from LMIC 
health contexts. In this study, the consideration of coping at 
various levels- as specific instances, as strategies that surround 
these instances, and also as aggregated adaptive processes 
(adapted from Tummers and colleagues’ framework32) – 
has enabled a systematic and detailed understanding of 
doctors’ coping behaviours in primary healthcare settings. 
To elaborate, examining individual coping instances helped 
to dissect doctors’ actions and these instances have served 
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as illustrative ideas around which to deepen discussion. 
Coping strategies that are more abstract than instances (such 
as routinising, rationing and categorising patients) have also 
helped to understand the mechanisms that define coping 
instances. Broader adaptive processes clarified how certain 
patterns of attitudes and behaviours eventually become part of 
work-routines at primary health centers. Overall, examining 
coping through these three levels has added depth as well as 
clarity to our understanding of doctors’ actions. Our analysis 
suggests the usefulness of further empirical work from LMICs 
that similarly considers coping behaviours in this layered way. 
In this study, we have paid particular attention to the 
broader adaptive processes of coping- resignation, risk-
averseness and the sacrifice of professional ideals. This is 
because such processes present a window for understanding 
informal routines – the “practical norms”6 – that develop over 
time and persist in public sector organizations. Our findings 
indicate that these adaptive processes are not specific to any 
particular scheme or policy; rather, they underlie all activities 
implemented from primary health centers and form the basis 
for de facto policy. Other studies have also touched upon such 
adaptive behaviours. Health providers in public health systems 
have expressed concerns about being used as “scapegoats” by 
the system,13 have reported being scared of being subjected 
to censure by the media and the community33; and also have 
expressed feeling “pursued rather than protected in the exercise 
of medical care;” 11 all of which contributes to the risk-averse 
coping routines that persist in public health systems.
In our study, adaptive coping processes often seemed to 
form the basis for the “collective divergence”34 of doctors from 
intended policy goals. Over time, most doctors seem to have 
learnt that survival in the system implies working mainly with 
formally imposed and heavily monitored policy mandates (ie, 
vertically-funded health programmes) and ignoring other 
services; and, as a result, have, over time, “drifted towards 
compatibility with the way (things are) evaluated” in the public 
sector.1 However, it is important to note that these imposed 
policy mandates appear only to influence “what” must be done 
at primary health centers, rather than the more nuanced “how” 
of the tasks involved- which is often, inevitably, left to the 
discretion of doctors. Thus, in a risk-averse environment with 
resigned attitudes and low levels of professional enthusiasm, 
policy mandates are often carried out in perfunctory ways. 
There is little ownership of tasks beyond obligatory reporting 
requirements; and as Stone35 puts it, there always seems to 
exist a “felt need to go on to the next client, the next report, or 
the next item of business.” Even exceptional providers who try 
hard to take ownership of tasks are limited by resources, lack 
of organizational support, and the constant informal pressure 
to be risk-averse; and these limitations often leaves them 
frustrated. These experiences result in the perfunctory and 
diluted implementation of primary healthcare policies.
This study also highlights a range of factors as influencing 
doctors’ practices in Indian primary health centers. We have 
categorised these as the underlying beliefs of doctors (values, 
individual beliefs and personal goals), professional (the 
lack of professional interest in primary care roles, missed 
opportunities to use clinical expertise and professional 
isolation), organizational (risk-averseness, strongly imposed 
top-down mandates and infrastructural constraints) and 
local socio-political (lack of community engagement and 
local political interference) factors. Similar categorizations 
of influencing factors have been used by others as well.2,3 
Many of the organizational and local socio-political factors 
elicited in this study – resource constraints, structural deficits, 
issues with organizational culture and relationships, and 
lack of connect with the community - have been noted in 
other empirical studies on frontline policy implementation 
that involve doctors,13,14 as well as other cadres of frontline 
staff.7-12,36-38 
 In our findings, the set of ‘professional’ factors play 
out strongly, and these interact in various ways with 
‘organizational’ factors to shape doctors’ actions. Although 
one other study has noted these interactions, as well as the 
challenges that doctors face in dealing with the duality of 
being a professional (a clinician) as well as a bureaucrat,14 
most SLB studies underplay the influence of professional 
factors over frontline worker actions.39 Lipsky in his original 
work does refer to professional identities as playing a role 
in shaping frontline worker response, but studies from the 
LMIC health sector that use SLB theory have usually placed 
less emphasis on this aspect. Our findings underscore the 
importance of examining both roles (being a ‘professional’ 
as well as being a ‘bureaucrat’) when considering frontline 
cadres (like doctors) that have a strong sense of professional 
identity. In our study, we found that most doctors felt they 
could not do justice to either of these roles due to the many 
organizational constraints they faced. This has led to long-
term demotivation and inculcated the attitudes of resignation 
among doctors that seem to have contributed to the delivery 
of poor quality care.
Some limitations of this study are noted. First, it was not 
easy to collect data on street-level coping behaviours. While 
doctors were often willing to talk about general challenges 
faced during work in the public system, it was not always 
easy for doctors to talk about specific instances. Some 
doctors preferred to speak in third person (about difficult 
situations faced by a colleague) rather than about themselves. 
Conversations that were not tape-recorded in general yielded 
better information, especially on certain themes pertaining to 
the public sector organization. However, even during untaped 
conversations, there were certain themes- corruption, taking 
and giving of bribes by doctors and private practice - known 
to exist in similar settings,40-41 that were not fully discussed 
by study participants, and so have not been reported in this 
paper. One important point that aided frank conversations 
was the fact that the first author who conducted the interviews 
was a doctoral student. A letter from the university seemed 
to assure doctors that they were not being tested for their 
competence or being evaluated by the organization secretly. 
Although we observed doctors while waiting at primary 
health centers, the evidence presented in this paper is mostly 
self-reported actions which could not be triangulated with 
observations. Finally, although we did purposefully select 
female doctor respondents, the majority of doctors available 
in these rural regions are men and so the opinions we report 
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are male-dominated. 
This study was done in one rural area, and we do not claim 
that the experiences we have reported here are representative 
of all doctors in rural primary healthcare settings. However, 
the rich, in-depth data from our study offers interesting 
insights into the nature of coping behaviours in such settings 
and factors that shape these behaviours. Based on these 
insights, we reflect below on what the study findings could 
mean for primary healthcare policies in India and other 
similar LMIC health contexts.
 Policies in India have historically been concerned about 
the challenge of recruiting doctors for work at primary health 
centers; as many doctors prefer to opt for private practice.42,43 
Even among those who work at primary health centers, 
frustration and lack of motivation has been documented.44,45 
However, there have been few interventions in the public 
sector in India to remedy the situation, besides technical 
training and structured incentives. Our evidence clearly 
points to the need for a different set of interventions; those 
that can deal with the fear of blame and frustration, help 
deal with challenging relationships and institute oversight 
mechanisms beyond measurement of specific performance 
indicators.
While the exact nature of these interventions needs to be 
context-specific, the general principles that surround a set 
of interventions to improve provider behaviour would likely 
remain the same across resource-constrained settings. Other 
LMIC studies using the SLB lens have pointed out the need 
for interventions that deal with ‘advocacy, awareness-raising, 
and debate at the frontline,’9 thereby making policies more 
meaningful to health providers.7,9,11 Interventions suggested 
in the literature from other LMICs include values’ clarification 
workshops, supportive supervision, engaging staff in 
reflection, consulting with staff regarding policy changes 
rather than imposing them top-down, using appreciative 
enquiry techniques and generally strengthening leadership at 
the frontline.2,7,46-49 The need to create spaces for deliberative 
and reflective practice has been pointed out.2 Recognising 
informal practices among frontline health workers and 
bringing about changes in the organizational culture that 
allow frontline health providers better access to and control 
over resources has also been shown as important.50,51 In 
summary, the need for ‘new and more creative strategies’ for 
motivating healthcare workers has been emphasized.52
To conclude, this study attempts to adds to the policy 
implementation literature in LMICs that applies the SLB lens. 
It illustrates that doctors’ decisions at primary health centers 
are shaped by their professional values as well as by formal 
and informal organizational requirements. It highlights that 
a range of informal practices have become ‘routinised’ in the 
health system, and that these can contribute to the disjuncture 
between policy goals and frontline realities. Thus, this study 
confirms the usefulness of the SLB lens in studying routine 
health policy implementation in LMICs.
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